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A  study  by  the  Centro  de  Políticas  Sociais  (CPS/IBRE/FGV)  which  was 
launched with a similar title in the same period last  year (immediately  after PNAD 
microdata had been released) has shown two marked changes in the poverty levels in 
Brazil: one in the 1993-95 period, in which the proportion of people below the poverty 
line  fell  18,47%,  and  another  one  in  2003-05,  in  which  it  fell  19,18%. These  two 
episodes 10 years apart have been separated by a period of relative stability in poverty 
levels,  interrupted  only  in  1998  and  2002.  The  existing  parallel  between  these  two 
episodes of permanent poverty reduction, just as the transitory fluctuation in election 





















1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 
In 1994 and 2000, PNAD data was not collected so these are average values 
Source: CPS/FGV processing PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
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The novelty in 2006 according to  the graph
2 is it  not only gives sequence to the 
achievements observed since 2003, but it is also the best year in the historical series, 
with a 15% decrease. In 2006, the proportion of extremely poor reaches 19.3% of the 
population with per capita income below R$125 per month (in Sao Paulo’s metropolitan 
area prices). The year 2006 keeps the trend observed in the recent democratic period in 
Brazilian politics that shows the best social results in election years. As the table below 
demonstrates:  
This study synthesizes the recent trends and cycles of poverty and inequality 
during the 1992 to 2004 period in Brazil, detailing some of its closest determinants with 
special emphasis on the role played by incomes policies. This is a condensed version of 
the work found in Neri (2007) http://www3.fgv.br/ibrecps/RET3/engl/index.htm. In the 
second  section,  we  describe  poverty  long-run  movements  by  monitoring  the 
achievement of the first goal of the millennium development goal of reducing poverty 
as insufficiency of income.  In section 3, we demonstrate the influences of electoral 
cycles over the income and the income transfers sponsored by the Brazilian state. In the 
following section, we present the main movement poverty across presidential mandates 
and city sizes, where we point out that the metropolitan crises was reversed in the last 
three years. Section 5 presents an analysis of unusual inequality fall in Brazil observed 
during  the  present  decade.  In  Section  6,  we  design  scenarios  of  per  capita  income 
growth and inequality in the future evolution of poverty. In sections 7, we calculate the 
minimum cost of eradicating poverty. In the three next sections, we discuss the role of 
income  policies,  tracing  first  a  parallel  between  income  policies  aiming  at  the 
stabilization and equalization of social results, we describe the role of different income 
sources in this process and also look ahead in the normative sense to analyze the desired 
features of the main income policies in order to fight poverty in more efficient and 
equitable way.  In section 10, we put Brasil social welfare in perspective through the 
lens of subjective evaluations of present and future happiness across countries. Finally, 
in the last section we present the main conclusions of this study where we point the 
differences found between average per capita growth estimates from  PNAD and the 
National Accounts during the 2005-06 period. 
                                                 
2  Defined as the share of the population with an income below 125 reais at São Paulo prices adjusted for 
regional differences in living costs. See Ferreira, Lanjouw e Neri (2003). In 1994 and 2000, PNAD data 
was not collected so these are average values 2. Millenium Development Goals and long-run trends 
 
Note that the fluctuations in the income gap pointed out above are robust to 
other  poverty  lines,  as  much  as  they  are  robust  to  the  1U$S/day  line,  calculated 
according to the MDGs, when it falls 11.8% between 2005 and 2006, from 5,32% to 
4.69% of the population. Just as we use our intuition to understand electoral cycles, we 
use the millennium development goals to consider the long-term trends of the poverty 
and its determinants 


























































































































In 1994 and 2000, PNAD data was not collected so these are average values 
Source: CPS/FGV processing PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
As we said last year, Brazil had already accomplished the first – and maybe the 
most famous - goal of the MDGs referring to the reduction of extreme poverty by 50% 
in 25 years, while the fall between 1992 and 2005 was of 54,61%. When we add 2006 to 
the series, the accumulated reduction reaches 58,54%, as the graph below illustrates
3. 
 
                                                 
3 Three weeks ago the UN announced the achievement of this goal, confirming the CPS forecast.   Cumulative Variation of Extreme Poverty
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In 1994 and 2000, PNAD data was not collected so these are average values 
Source: CPS/FGV processing PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
Adopting the higher poverty line proposed by the Centro de Políticas Sociais 
(CPS/IBRE/FGV), we verify that the accumulated decrease in the respective income 
gap between 1992 and 2006 was of 45.1% - hence we have not yet reached its half-life 
during  the  period  in  our  series  of  poverty  from  PNAD  data.  The  average  poverty 
reduction rate from 1992 to 2006 was 5.54% per year, which is almost exactly twice the 
necessary rate to reduce the extreme poverty to its half in 25 years, or 2,73% a year. 
Given the involved different time horizons, we will compare the statistics in 
terms of average annual growth rate that will allow a direct comparison with the results 
from  last  year.  For  instance,  2006’s  15%  reduction  in  poverty  suggest  that,  in  the 
arithmetic of the MDGs, we have advanced in the last year alone what we should have 
achieved in 5,1 years. The fall in poverty since the 2003 recession reaches on average 
11,8% a year, that is, each year of the period we call Lula’s Real corresponds to 4,1 
years of the MDG commitment; while during the original Real boom period (1993 to 
1995), we grew 10,74% each year on average, which corroborates the parallels between 
the two episodes of this paper.  
In the same way that we used the MDGs to consider the long term trends in 
poverty, we now use the electoral cycles to understand some of the social oscillations 
that are clear to the naked eye.  
 3. Cycles and Elections 
 
The  year  2006  keeps  the  trend  observed  in  the  recent  democratic  period  in 
Brazilian politics that shows the best social results in election years. As the table below 
demonstrates:  
 
Variation in Median Income and Electoral Cycles* 
1982  3%    1989  6%    1998  2% 
1983  -23%    1990  -2%    1999  -4% 
1984  -1%    1992  -3%    2001  2% 
1985  20%    1993  -2%    2002  1% 
1986  53%    1995  25%    2003  -4% 
1987  -27%    1996  0%    2004  6% 
1988  -11%    1997  3%    2005  9% 
            2006  10% 
 
 
*In 1991, 1994 and 2000, PNAD data was not collected so these are average values 
Source: CPS/FGV processing PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
The data in the table demonstrate that the median per capita household income 
has increased in all years that preceded a national election for both legislature or the 
presidency  since  1980(that  is:  1982,  1986,  1989,  1998,  2002  e  2006)  and  that  this 
income  has  fallen  in  all  post-election  years  (1983,  1987,  1990,  1999  e  2003).  The 
average variation rate in the median income in pre-election years was 12,52% against -
11,87% in post-election years, when the adjustment account is made. In the most recent 
elections,  the  political  cycles  were  less  exacerbated,  but  still  with  political  cycles: 
4,38% of election years against -3,68% post-election years.  The literature on political-
electoral cycles studies the behavior of politicians who try to entice the electorate, by 
signaling improvements in living standards in the election years as a way to influence 
the result of the elections. According to the political economy literature The median 
voter is the one who decides the election. Hence, the option for the median income, 
which is dated close to the first round of the elections, at the beginning of October – 
when the PNAD is usually launched. As PNAD did not collect data in 1994 and 2007, it 
is not possible to capture the effects of cycles associated to the two episodes that have been  highlighted  in  this  paper
4.  In  the  table  below,  we  present  a  summary  of  the 
fluctuations in poverty rates in pre- and post- election years.  
 
Variation in Poverty Rate and Electoral Cycles* 
1982  0%    1990  1%    1998  -5% 
1983  19%    1991  0%    1999  4% 
1984  -1%    1992  0%    2000  -1% 
1985  -13%    1993  0%    2001  -1% 
1986  -37%    1994  -10%    2002  -3% 
1987  47%    1995  -10%    2003  5% 
1988  13%    1996  1%    2004  -10% 
1989  -5%    1997  -2%    2005  -10% 
            2006  -15% 
*In 1991, 1994 and 2000, PNAD data was not collected so these are average values 
Source: CPS/FGV processing PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
Similarly, when analyzing the poverty trends present in the following table, we 
observe a fall in almost all the seven legislative/presidential elections since 1980 (1981 
is the exception), an increase in all post-electoral years and a fall in the electoral year 
The average rate of variation in poverty in pre-electoral years was -7,69%, against in 
post-electoral years. We analyze these trends in greater detail in a further section  
In the final annex we detail the channels of public action that have recently 
affected income in electoral episodes and that has been captured by the new PNAD, that 
is, 1998, 2002 and 2006. The table below synthesizes the main findingsvalues:  
 
Equation of the Per capita household income log – various sources   




1) Votes  0,4192  **  0,3125  **  0,5129  **  0,2857  ** 
2) electoral  0,0611  **  0,0316  **  0,1051  **  0,2257  ** 
3) votes * electoral  0,0136  **  0,0127  **  0,0274  **  0,0343  ** 
** Significant at 95%                 
Source: CPS/FGV from  PNAD/IBGE microdata           
Obs:controlled by sex, ethnicity, head of the household, educational level, size of the city, migration and State 
 
  Data clearly shows for all income sources (ie. Income from main work, income 
from the social security, income from social programs) that: 1) per capita income is 
                                                 
4 There is evidence that these two years are different from other electoral cycles not because of the timing of the 
policy, but because of how long its effects have lasted. lower for people aged above the minimum voting age  
5 (16 years of age and above) in 
Brazil , which is not new in Brazil or elsewhere. The greatest differential in income is 
found in social security: 51,29% higher for voters and the smallest differential is in 
social programs, where income is 28,57%; 2) income increased more in election years, 
characterizing the electoral cycle. In this case, income from social programs increases 
more in election times 22,57%, followed by social security, 10,51%, and work 3,16 % - 
already in another level indicating the use of income transfer programs according to the 
election cycle. 3) Finally, and moreimportantly, the more specific test is if – despite 
considering the per capita household income that smoothes the effects tested here – the 
income of people in voting age increases more in an election year than the income of 
children and teenagers who do not participate directly in this market. This difference in 
difference is captured by the interaction of the two variables mentioned above. In this 
case, the main relative gain is of the social programs related income with 3,43% more in 
favor of voters in election years in relation to others, that is, children and teenagers 
below  the  voting  age.  Social  security  follows  with  2,74%,  followed  by  the  indirect 
effect of income from main work with 1,27%
6. Note that in this empirical test carried 
out last years the hypothesis #3 above presented the expected signal, but it was not 
meaningful for main work and social security income – which illustrates the potential 
magnitude  of  the  impact  of  the  last  presidential  elections  for  income  data.  The 
qualitative soothing factor that must be applied to the 2006 and 1994 elections, whose 
data were not collected (1994) or which  are not  yet available (2007,  the 2006 post 
election), is that the effects seem to last longer than all the remaining election episodes 
that took place in the Brazilian democratic system. In other words, we are talking about 
expansions of a sustained character to people’s lives, hence the expression “real” goes 
beyond the monetary denomination, and applies to these two episodes
7.  
 
                                                 
5 Income from social programs include Bolsa-Família, unemployment benefit, among other public programs, but also 
the financial income whose main source is also the state. The income from all sources also include the income from 
other employments, rents, private transfers between households (maintenance payment, donations, etc)  
6 In the respective section, we illustrate the importance of political cycles  directly for the work income through raises 
in the wages of public servants in the three government levels, particularly the municipal level at the time of voting. 
In  the  case  of  hiring  public  servants,  the  effect  is  negative  maybe  given  the  electoral  year’s  restriction  in  job 
openings.  
7 Proofing up the social policy in election times when social programs are geared for voting purposes or when good 
programs are ended during the transition between governments, was attempted unsuccessfully, in the last presidential 
election in México – but still it is na agenda that needs to be pursued.  4. Analysis of poverty changes by government periods 
 
The  data  chronology  per  government  periods  reconciles  the  analyses  of  the 
fluctuations in the short- and long-term trends per administrative term. Limitations of 
this  kind  of  analysis  are  outside  the  control  of  the  federal  government,  such  as 
international crises, and actions by other actors such as families, companies NGOs, etc, 
and the remaining levels of government. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the role of 
the federal government as facilitator, coordinator and motivator of the other agents is 
part of its responsibility. Another consideration refers to the lag in the effects of social 
and  economic  policies.  As  the  centre  of  our  analysis  here  are  the  so-called  income 
policies, which by virtue of their operational speed are more immune to these types of 
problems. 
Observing it by government periods, the poverty rate calculate by the CPS falls 
8,47% per year in the first Lula term (de 2002 a 2006) against 3,14% in the two Cardoso 
terms (de 1993 a 2002)
8, which is formed by the reduction observed in the first Cardoso 
term of 5,1% per year and 0,427% of his second term as president. 
Cumulative Variation of the Poverty Rate - Brazil
TOTAL
Lula I 2006/2002 -27.7%
FHC 2002/1993 -24.3%
FHC II 2002/1998 -1.7%
FHC I 1998/1993 -23.0%
Real II 2006/2003 -31.4%
Real I 2002/1998 -1.7%
Equity 2006/2001 -30.1%
Total 2006/1992 -45.1%  
Source: CPS/FGV processing PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
Annual Variation of the Poverty Rate  -  Brazil
TOTAL
Lula I 2006/2002 -7.79%
FHC 2002/1993 -3.05%
FHC II 2002/1998 -0.43%
FHC I 1998/1993 -5.10%
Real II 2006/2003 -11.82%
Real I 2002/1998 -0.43%
Equity 2006/2001 -6.91%
Total 2006/1992 -4.19%  
Source: CPS/FGV processing PNAD/IBGE microdata 
                                                 
8  The Cardoso government begin in January 1995, so it would be natural to use data from October 1994, when the 
PNAD was implemented. But there was no Pnad in 1994, so we have chosen to use 1993 data as the initial term of 
government, as the data from the Pesquisa Mensal do Emprego indicates that the largest share in the reduction of 
work  income  poverty  observed  between  1993  and  1995  took  place  in  the  first  semester  of  1995,  already  into 
Cardoso’s term.   
Analyzing poverty by city size: the metropoles (compared to urban and rural 
areas) showed the largest relative increase in poverty between 1995 and 2003, with 
41%, reflecting the so called metropolitan crises (Neri (2000)). However, since 2003 the 
metropolis averted this scenario, reaching the lowest level in the series in 2006, by 
going back to the government periods at an average rate of poverty fall was rigorously 
equal for the first Cardoso and Lula terms in 6,1% a year. In the period 1998-2002, 
there  was  an  increase  of    2.9%  in  the  metropolitan  poverty,  as  a  result  of  the 
unemployment crises and the recovery afterwards. The biggest cities, by the smallest 
presence of official social safety nets and the biggest exposure to market oscillations, 
are those that maximize further the effects of the economic cycle oscillations. Rural 
areas present reduction in poverty levels in virtually all years in the series since 1992. 
Urban areas outside rural centers present the best relative performance for the whole 
period, falling 4.8% a  year against 3,44% in the metropolitan areas, 3,23% in rural 
areas. 
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Source: CPS/FGV processing PNAD/IBGE microdata 
 
It is worth pointing out that the average per capita income growth was 9.1%, 
much  higher  than  the  per  capita  GDP  which  was  1,4%  in  2006,  even  after  the 
methodological revision of the national accounts. The first figure suggests a Chinese-
like growth, while the second figure points to a Haitian-like stagnation.   
5. Distribution in the Decade of Inequality Reduction 
 
In overall terms, 2006 is marked more by the generalized growth of income for 
all population strata than for the reduction in inequality compared to the last 15 years, as 
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Source: CPS/FGV processing PNAD/IBGE microdata 
 Next we present the accumulated gain of income between 2001 and 2006 for 
each tenth part of the population. The rate of growth decreases as we progress from the 
first  (57,47%)  to  the  last  tenth  (6,84%),  and  this  progressive  character  is  not  well 
captured by the apparently small changes in the Gini index series.  
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Source: CPS/FGV processing PNAD/IBGE microdata 
 Isolating the last years available in the research, the Brazilians’ average income 
increased, according to Pnad, 9,16% in 2006 against 2,3% of per capita GDP growth in 
the same year, even after the methodological revision of national accounts. The first 
figure suggests a Chinese-like growth, while the second figure points to a Haitian-like 
stagnation. In 2006, the average income of the 50% poorest increased 11,99% against 
7,85% of the 10% richest, or 9,66% of the 40% intermediate group. Conversely, the 
inequality measured by the Gini index decreases at an intermediate value of –1,06%, 
much lower than values from three previous years: -1,2% in 2002, 1% in 2003, -1,9% in 
200$ and –0,6% in 2005. Summing up: all have won larger increases than in all years of 
the decade, that is, the 2006 improvement is greater than previous years’, including 
2004.  
 
Variation in the per capita income of Brazilians per 
year    
         
  Total  50% poorest  40% 
intermediate  10% richest 
2006  9,16  11,99  9,66  7,85 
2005  6,63  8,56  5,74  6,89 
2004  3,14  8,34  4,13  0,68 
2003  -5,81  -4,15  -4,67  -7,32 
2002  0,30  3,65  0,34  -0,68 
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD/IBGE microdata   
 
The  growth  in  average  income  corresponded  to  9,16  %  with  a  slight  pure 
redistribution effect. That is, the cake has grown for all, but with more baking powder 
for the poorest half of the population. We present below the graph of the income growth 
per tenth part and a table with income strata aggregations that show smaller gains to the 
first  tenths  of  the  population.  This  might  relate  to  the  choice  of  combining  income 
policies focusing on the increase in the minimum wage and less increases in the Bolsa 
Familia in 2004 but resembling 2005, as the graph shows. Annual Variation of Mean Income - Brazil (2006/2005)
9.84%
12.26% 12.38% 12.64% 11.64% 10.57% 9.46% 9.23% 9.51%
7.85%
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Source: CPS/FGV processing PNAD/IBGE microdata 
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Source: CPS/FGV processing PNAD/IBGE microdata 
 
6. Poverty Future Scenarios 
 
This is a traditional section in our yearly studies of poverty released soon after 
the  Pnad  launch,  where  we  make  projections  for  the  next  year.  In  general,  there  is 
information about two trimesters of the national accounts, data from the metropolitan 
job  market  from  PME  and  Caged  covering  at  least  the  same  period,  allowing  the 
projection of PNAD growth and of the inequality rates, choosing a Lorenz curve of 
reference and making an association with synthetic indexes, notably the Gini index. Nonetheless, we have faced more difficulties in foreseeing the product trends rather 
than the inequality’s in 2005 and 2006. 
The proportion of extremely poor people in Brazil (individuals living with less than R$ 
125 a month at São Paulo prices in October 2006) will fall fom 19,3% in 2006 to 
18,55% in 2007, a 3,95% drop, if the national per capita income grows 3% in the year. 
If the income growth is similar to last year’s (9%) the poverty rate will fall to 17% of 
the population, a 12% decrease.  
The reduction will be even greater if this growth comes hand in hand with some 
reduction in inequality. If the 3% expansion was combined with a decrease in the Gini 
index (reaching Rio de Janeiro’s levels of 0,5605, for instance) the Brazilian poverty 
would fall c. 14,57%. The proportion of extremely poor people would be 16,50%.  
In a long-term vision, poverty could recede 28,21% if in the next four years 
income would grow 4% a year, combined with a decrease in inequality that would lead 
to the Southeast region levels in 2004 (i.e. Gini 0,54479). 
 
 






Brazil 2006 489.56 19.32
Inequality Effect (RJ) 
     with Growth 
0%  490.82 18.63 -3.55%
3%  505.55 18.06 -6.50%
9%  534.99  16.57  -14.22%
12% 549.72 15.99 -17.19%
Inequality Effect (Southeast) 
     with Growth 
0%  490.82 17.16 -11.17%
3%  505.55 16.50 -14.57%
9%  534.99 15.36 -20.49%
12% 549.72 14.68 -23.98%
16% 569.35 13.87 -28.21% 
7. Poverty eradication costs 
 
A useful measure in the design of public policies is the income gap(P1). That is, 
how much income is still needed on average for the extremely poor to be able to meet 
their  basic  needs.  Using  our  income  gap  line  as  the  basis,  the  average  deficit  in 
monetary terms of each extremely poor Brazilian would be R$ 48,52. As just part of the 
Brazilian population is below the line, data shows that it would be necessary R$ 9,37 on 
average to alleviate poverty in Brazil, at a total cost of monthly R$ 1.717.955.185 or 
yearly R$ 20.615.462.223.  
This information reveals how much it would cost to complement the income of 
each  Brazilian  up  to  the  R$  18  national  line  (or  R$  125  at  Sao  Paulo  prices,  see 
appendix) that is, the lowest amount of transfers to lift each extremely poor person up to 
the basic need level. 
This  exercise  should  not  be  seen  as  a  defense  in  favour  of  certain  specific 
policies,  but  as  a  reference  to  the  social  opportunity  cost  of  adopting  non-focalized 
policies. The data is useful to define policy targets and organize the financing sources.  
 
8. Income Policies: Stabilization and Equity 
 
As  it  is  known,  the  change  in  poverty  levels  in  the  1993-95  period    was 
associated to the implementation of the Real Plan, but what are the associated features 
for changes in poverty levels between 2003 and 2006,in particular in 2006, whose data 
has just been made available. What are the differences in the determining factors of 
social  performance,  based  on  income  in  the  last  government  terms  and  future 
perspectives, the determinant of the combination ,not always harmonious,  of the growth 
and inequality vectors and the resulting change in poverty and social welfare? What 
would be the role of changes in the external and internal environments in these future 
scenarios  and  the  previous  history?  More  specifically,  what  role  do  macroeconomic 
policies (such as inflation targets, fiscal responsibility and fluctuating exchange rate) 
and previous educational policies play in the employment indicators and in the social 
indicators  based  on  income?  Lastly,  what  is  the  role  of    income  transfer  policies sponsored by the state, as the expansion of the Bolsa Familia and the minimum wage 
adjustments  play  in  the  changes  observed?  What  are  the  specific  channels  of  these 
policies operations? These are some of the questions which we would like to answer, so 
that  the  causes  (and  consequences)  of  the  recent  reduction  in  inequality  could  be 
assessed.  We  offer  a  mix  of  each  of  these  elements  by  updating  past  research.  We 
believe that this type of analysis helps to understand the social changes observed in the 
last years, as much as the challenges, limitations and opportunities beyond the second 
term. In this sense, we devote some attention to the recent evolution in the education 
indicators and the ex-ante evaluation of educational policies, as determining factors for 
the distribution of income in Brazil.  
An important part of this decrease in inequality has occurred since 2001, so 
much  so  that  we  have  coined  it  the  decade  of  reduction  in  inequality,  in  the  same 
manner as the previous decade could be coined stabilization decade – both of which are 
part of the same process.  
It  is  true  that  other  important  achievements  occurred,  such  as  the 
universalization of the primary school education in the second half of the 1990s, or the 
job market turning point in the last  years also  associated with the  greater equity in 
income-  but this last one is undoubtedly the most marked in a country with the greatest 
inequality in the most unequal continent in the world. Similarly, Brazil had been the 
country with the highest inflation in the world between 1960 and 1995, higher even than 
Argentina. The fact is that Brazilian inflation is in its lowest levels in decades and 
inequality  of  Brazilian  income  is  in  the  lowest  level  since  1976  when  PNAD  are 
available. In both cases, stability and equality, the so called income policies have played 
an instrumental role. The inertial anti-inflation plans, among which Cruzado, Collor e 
Real Plan were the main examples, that also included  income policies sponsored by the 
State as the main ingredient – for good or bad – affecting the process of price formation 
and  income  determination,  such  as  price  freezes,  exchange  rate  policies,  wage 
conversion and currency change. In the anti-inequality policies, other types of income 
policies are used where the state acts directly on the pockets of agents taking it from the 
public budget (the so called collective pocket). That is, through redistributive programs 
- where the similarities of the central elements of the anti-inflation programs are also 
called income policies and can help or hinder the achievement of the objectives, but 
which  have  in  common  the  speed  that  they  impose  to  the  process  of  seeking  the 
objectives, be it of price stability, be it of income equality. Maybe a function of the capacity of rapidly affecting the processes, there is strong evidence that one or another 
type of income policy used in conjunction with electoral cycles, we will come back to 
this point later on. The role of stabilization is played now by the redistributive income 
policies. Obviously, stabilization and redistribution are sides of the same coin, since 
there is no way to obtain a reduction in inequality with high inflation. Although, we are 
talking about necessary conditions, not sufficient ones. Cardoso stabilized the currency, 
Lula  continued  this  process  and  redistributed  this  stable  currency  through  a  social 
programs structure initiated by its predecessor. Now, in the same way that we have 
taken  a  long  time  to  learn  in  Brazil  about  the  importance  of  the  macroeconomic 
fundaments in the achievement of lasting stability, the achievement of the sustained 
decrease  in  inequality  depends  on  the  fundaments,  the  inequality  in  opportunities, 
represented by the access to stocks of productive assets as health and education that 
people have access to since the beginning of their lives. The biggest challenge of the 
new generation of redistributive income policies is to follow the changes in income flux 
with the highest stocks of future productive wealth by the poor – the best representative 
is the Bolsa-Família, its “tupiniquim” predecessors (Bolsa-Escola, Bolsa-Alimentação, 
Peti etc) and its Latin American counterparts (Oportunidades and Progressa in México, 
Praaf in Honduras). This is yet to be achieved and consolidated in the social policy in 
Brazil:  to  reinforce  the  structural  side  of  compensatory  policies  with  incentive  to 
demand by accumulating human capital, that has to be combined with an improvement 
in the quality in the structural policies where health and education are important. The 
Education PAC and the new agenda for health involve sector specific actions and other 
indirect effects, such as the provision of sanitation and fertility control, as well as anti-
smoking campaigns and car accident prevention.  
In what concerns the short term aspect of fighting inequality, there is no doubt 
that  there  is  in  Brazil  a  generation  of  policies  better  focused  and  capable  of 
redistributing  income,  than  the  policies  implemented  in  the  remote  past  but  still 
applicable. The problem in Brazil is that it does not  opt for new generation policies to  
the  detriment  of  other  less  effective  ones  when  attacking  inequality  and  the 
improvement in the welfare (including the effects of the cake growth). Hybrid and less 
focused policy will have lesser impact than if the resources were allocated today or in 
the future in the more focused policy. Brasil has opted for expanding both, new and old 
policies, focalized and  non-focalized.  In the words of Ricardo Paes de  Barros from 
IPEA we keep throwing money out of a helicopter, the difference being that now the doors have opened also over poor corners and slums, hitherto not targeted by previous 
policies.  
 
9. Income policies: evidence from facts 
 
Otherwise, let us see: what are the income elements responsible for the reduction 
in inequality? In particular, how the different income sources interacted in this process 
of income deconcentration? The tables below present the level and composition of the 
great groups of income sources for different income strata of the population in 2006, 
which will be later contrasted with other types. 
In general, average per capita income of R$491 monthlyconsists of R$ 372 from 
work, R$ 96 from social security benefits, R$ 11 from government transfers of social 
programs and R$ 12 of private transfers, such as maintenance payments and money 
exchanged between households. Summing up, private income (work, family transfer) 
amounts to R$ 384 , whereas public income amounts to R$ 107. Income from work is 
between 75% and 76% of the big income strata, and social security income has less 
space in the lowest segments of the income distribution 16,24% of the poorest half 
against 19,58% of the total.  The biggest difference refers to the public transfers from 
social programs as Bolsa Familia, unemployment insurance and interest income that are 
equivalent to  6.73% of the income of the lower strata in the income distribution against 
2,16% of the total.  Income Composition in 2006 
Average Income 
Total  50-  40  10+ 
ALL INCOME SOURCES  490.82                142.13                496.02               2,080.76              
WORK  372.07                107.25                373.63               1,589.90              
SOCIAL SECURITY  96.09                  23.09                  106.00               393.67                 
SOCIAL PROGRAMS  10.61                  9.56                    7.16                  27.66                   
PRIVATE TRANSFERS  12.03                  2.23                    9.21                  69.39                   
PUBLIC TRANSFERS (SOCIAL SEC + SOC PROG)  106.70                32.65                  113.16               421.33                 
Vertical composition of the average income  
Total  50-  40  10+ 
ALL INCOME SOURCES  490.82                142.13                496.02               2,080.76              
WORK  75.8%  75.5%  75.3%  76.4% 
SOCIAL SECURITY  19.6%  16.2%  21.4%  18.9% 
SOCIAL PROGRAMS  2.2%  6.7%  1.4%  1.3% 
PRIVATE TRANSFERS  2.5%  1.6%  1.9%  3.3% 
PUBLIC TRANSFERS (SOCIAL SEC + SOC PROG)  21.7%  23.0%  22.8%  20.2%  
Source: CPS/FGV processing PNAD/IBGE microdata 
 
Since 2001, when inequality suffered the referred inflection, the total income of 
the poorest half grew 5,53% per capita a year against 2,92% of the 40% intermediate 
and 1,33% of the richest 10%. When we open the data per different income type, we see 
that income from work of the poorest grows at a rate (4,4% a year) twice as big as the 
middle segments (2,1% a year) and more than 3 times the higher tenth (1,3% a year). 
These gains might be related to the process of universal access to primary schooling in 
the previous period.  The income from social security has a higher relative gains in the 
40% intermediate 10.6% a year, against 4,1% a year of the 10% richest, and 10.2% a 
year of the 50% poorest. That is, the strong security gains, given the relative weight of 
the family  and public budget, observed in the  period, are not particularly pro poor. 
Nonetheless, the social security benefits value nominal adjustments since 1998, which 
gave  greater  rises  to  the  minimum  wage  base  than  to  other  benefits,  were  more 
progressive  than  the  previous  practice.  Moving  on  to  the  concept  that  captures  the 
expansion of new social programs (but unfortunately not only the effects of them) we 
have an increase of 40.8% in these programs among the poorest half, 30,3% for the 40% 
intermediate group and 3,4% for the 10% richest. 








2006/2005 9.2% 9.1% 7.7% 33.5% 5.8%
2005/2004 6.6% 6.1% 7.3% 18.3% 9.0%
2004/2001 -0.9% -1.5% 1.0% 18.5% -2.9%
2001/1995 0.0% -0.9% 4.5% 0.9% -1.1%
1995/1993 11.4% 11.8% 11.6% -36.5% 48.2%
Equity 2006/2001 2.5% 2.0% 3.6% 21.3% 1.1%
Total* 2006/1993 2.7% 2.1% 5.2% 0.9% 6.1%  
Source: CPS/FGV processing PNAD/IBGE microdata 
 
 






2006/2005 12.0% 10.0% 10.2% 54.1% 1.4%
2005/2004 8.6% 8.9% 7.9% 2.9% 16.3%
2004/2001 2.5% 1.2% 1.8% 51.8% -2.2%
2001/1995 0.3% -0.2% 1.1% 27.6% 2.3%
1995/1993 12.0% 11.3% 15.1% -12.5% 27.8%
Equity 2006/2001 5.5% 4.4% 4.6% 40.8% 2.0%
Total* 2006/1993 4.0% 3.3% 4.5% 25.1% 5.7%  
 






2006/2005 9.7% 8.9% 10.6% 44.4% 8.6%
2005/2004 5.7% 4.3% 10.4% 31.5% 0.4%
2004/2001 -0.1% -0.8% 1.8% 25.5% -1.5%
2001/1995 0.0% -1.0% 5.6% -2.0% -0.4%
1995/1993 12.7% 13.3% 8.4% -28.3% 46.3%
Equity 2006/2001 2.9% 2.1% 5.2% 30.3% 0.8%
Total* 2006/1993 3.0% 2.3% 5.9% 4.2% 6.1%  
 






2006/2005 7.9% 9.0% 4.1% 2.1% 5.5%
2005/2004 6.9% 7.1% 4.0% 28.0% 12.7%
2004/2001 -2.5% -3.0% -0.1% -3.3% -4.1%
2001/1995 -0.1% -0.9% 4.7% -2.4% -1.8%
1995/1993 10.2% 10.7% 12.7% -39.7% 53.1%
Equity 2006/2001 1.3% 1.3% 1.6% 3.4% 0.9%
Total* 2006/1993 2.0% 1.6% 4.7% -7.3% 6.2%  
Source: CPS/FGV processing PNAD/IBGE microdata 
 
  10. The new generation of income policies 
 
The long-term objective of social policies is to enable individuals to realize their 
productive potential. This movement can be achieved in various ways: by completing 
the portfolio of their assets or their access to markets where they are dealing. These 
public policies provide exit doors out of poverty by opening up ways and platforms of 
access to markets. In this last case, it is possible to generate welfare gains without fiscal 
implications,  which  makes  them  very  attractive.  The  desired  upgrades  of  the  Bolsa 
Familia, as seen in the presented figure would be: (i) firstly, to seek a more effective 
focus ever and avoid less focalized alternatives, which are more permanent, such as 
increases in the minimum wage and unconditional universal provision of the minimum 
income; (ii)secondly, to seek the improvement in the program conditionality, such as in 
the  age  group  between  0  and  6,  to  focus  on  the  pre-school  and  even  in  nurseries, 
integrating  these  demand  incentives  with  education  supply  elements  could  be  more 
interesting  than  the  current  Bolsa  Familia,  which  only  demands  the  children 
immunization; (iii) Improve the quality of education for people aged between 7 and 15, 
demanding  not  only  quantity  but  also  education  quality,  creating  incentives  for  this 
based on the new information sources, like the Prova Brasil. An in the later phase of 
Bolsa Familia actions, (iv) to create not an incentive to the first job, but through a 
second Bolsa Familia that would improve the low educational levels observed in all 
parts of Brazil. Finally, (v) to improve the access to markets of goods and finance, 
expanding the credit frontier to where it had never been before: the poor and informal 
workers  through  the  use  of  social  benefits  as  collateral
9.  We  present  a  scheme  of 
upgrades based on income policies. 
 
                                                 
9 See “O Efeito-Colateral” and “Alvorada: um projeto acima de qualquer governo” both published in the 
Revista Conjuntura Econômica in 2002.  
 
The advantage of compensatory policies is, in general, the speed with which 
their effects are felt. In contrast, the associated metaphor of structural policies is that 
you teach how to fish, instead of giving the fish. The issue is not whether policies 
involve income transfers or asset stocks, but their social implications in the short and 
long terms. A compensatory action that hinders the productive de-structuring - as the 
task forces against drought - or that motivates the accumulation of capital - like bolsa 
Familia - can have persistent effects over poverty. The long-term impact of income 
transfers from insurance and social leverage is comparable to the transfer of assets.  
 
11. The general happiness of nations  
 
I  remember  when,  eleven  years  ago,  I  wore  a  pair  of  glasses  for  myopia 
correction for the first time. Beginning to notice the depth and clarity of things around 
me gave me an indescribable feeling. I marveled at the shape of the world around me, 
much more subtle and interesting that I had seen that far! Similarly, the possibilities of 
seeing the details in our society have evolved through the years. An important landmark in this process was the decision made by the IBGE in 1995 to release its research-
related microdata concomitantly to the release of the Institute’s tabulations and reports. 
This small great leap forward gave individuals the freedom to look at the Brazilian 
social  data  from  their  own  perspective,  as  opposed  to  a  pre-established  one.  The 
independence and transparence of official institutions such as the IBGE and IPEA is as 
important today as the Central Bank’s. Nowadays, at the release of each PNAD, Caged 
and  others  among  this  amazing  bundle  of  acronyms  and  numbers,  Brazilian  society 
debates its own achievements and drawbacks with increasing interest and knowledge. 
The more democratic environment in the political arena and in the access to information 
(enabled by the so-called information and communication era) has both contributed to 
the transparence and integrity of the public debate. I remember reading in the New York 
Times in 1994, more or less at the same time when I began wearing those glasses, some 
news on social issues such as the determinants of women’s unemployment or the weight 
of children, and I would think how distant we were from all of this in Brazil. At that 
time, we would think first and foremost in inflation rates that distorted our senses and 
concerns on a daily basis. Access to information undergoes continuous advances and 
discreet leaps described above, such as stabilization, public disclosure of information, 
the invention of the Internet (which has been attributed to Al Gore), etc. Today I am 
particularly  excited  about  the  possibilities  brought  about  by  the  last  generation  of 
international surveys, of which Gallup’s World Survey is maybe the best example. This 
new breed of survey brings two important innovations. Firstly, they apply one single 
questionnaire to representative samples in more than 130 countries, allowing a global 
comparison  allied  to  the  flexibility  that  is  enabled  by  the  processing  of  individual 
answers (microdata). The second novelty refers to the type of question that is asked, 
side by side with traditional survey questions. The respondent is asked directly about 
individual  and  collective  subjective  matters,  be  they  local,  national  or  global.  This 
feature  allows  the  researcher  to  really  dive  into  the  way  that  people  form  their 
aspirations, attitudes and expectations, as the questionnaire starts by enquiring about the 
interviewee’s  perceived  happiness,  moving  on  to  assessments  about  the  national 
educational system and about his city’s local economy. This survey materializes the 
vision of our geographer and great world citizen, Milton Santos: “Man does not see the 
universe from the universe, but he sees the universe from a specific place” – and he did 
not refer only to geography. The  Centre  for  Social  Policies  (CPS/IBRE/FGV)  has  just  been  selected  with 
other  Latin  American  institutions  by  the  Inter-American  Development  Bank  to  help 
digest Gallup’s global data. This ambitious project will mark IADB’s 50
th anniversary 
by bringing quality of life, as perceived by the respondents themselves, into the debate’s 
center stage. We are releasing some of this data here preliminarily, without involving 
any of the other institutions of this project. Firstly, and more importantly, how is the 
Brazilian’s perceived level of satisfaction with life (in 2006) vis-à-vis the remaining 
inhabitants  in  this  global  community?  In  a  subjective  scale  from  0  to  10  points, 
Brazilians rate 6.61 compared to 5.25 from the rest of the world and 5.64 from Latin 
America’s  countries.  Comparatively,  the  USA  have  rated  7.09,  whilst  Belgium  and 
India – both that have recurrently been references in the Brazilian social debate - have 
rated 7.15 and 5.27 respectively. Denmark holds the world record for happiness with 
7.98, while Chad ranks last with 3.36. 
How has happiness evolved in the last five years in the world? It has gone up 
from 4.84 in 2001 to 5.26 in 2006. That is, the first five years in the new millennium 
showed a considerable and consistent advance as a result of the expansion in world 
economy. The same question for the year 2011 points to a rate of 6.0 to the world. In 
other words, we expect a 25% growth in the world level of perceived happiness when 
comparing how we used to see ourselves five years ago and how we see ourselves five 
years ahead – 2/3 of this advance is expected to happen in the second half of the decade. 
This positive scenario is at risk today given the recent turmoil in markets. My fears are 
allayed by FED’s president, Mr. Ben Bernanke who, more than anyone I am aware of, 
knows  the  role  of  credit  problems  in  propagating  a  recession.    With  regard  to  the 
expected level of happiness 5 years from now, Brazil beats all the other 130 countries in 
the sample by reaching a rate of 8.24. Consequently, in the opinion of the Brazilian 
themselves, we will be happier in 2011 than the Danish – which would rank second with 
its current 7.86. The least optimistic country about its own future happiness is Paraguay 
with 4.08. Obviously, Brazil’s result could be only an imaginary representation of our 
innate  optimism.  In  order  to  control  for  cultural  aspects,  we  have  compared  our 
expected happiness leap for the next five years with the current levels. According to the 
survey,  Brazilians  expect  to  gain  2.56  in  the  next  five  years,  exceeded  only  by  10 
countries in the sample, of which the Chinese impresses with its 3.04. On  average,  our  economic  growth  is  not  Chinese-like.  What  would  be  the 
determinants of the Brazilian optimism? A reduction in inequality since 2001? Gains 
from the 2006 elections?  
 
12.  Are we growing like Haiti or like China?  
 
“PNAD income grew at a Chinese-like pace of 16,4% between 2005 and 2006, 4,3 
times larger than the Haitian per capita GDP growth. Where Brazil is?” 
 
In the last section, I presented some evidence of the positive expectations of Brazilians 
towards their lives in the future. In a sample of 132 countries in 2006, Brazil is where 
citizens are most optimistic about their happiness in 5 years time. The world’s greatest 
prospective happiness! Now, why expect so much if our economic scenario does not 
rival other emerging countries’? At the pace of the national accounts statistics, and GDP 
in  particular,  we  would  not  be  a  real  BRIC  (Brasil,  Russia,  India  and  China)  or  a 
building  brick  of  future  global  wealth.  Intrisic  optimism  helps  to  explain  why  the 
Brazilian expectation and reality are out of beat with each other.  Inebriated by this 
optimism, Brazilian’s glass is always half full. Nonetheless, even by calculating the 
difference  between  future  expectations  and  the  current  reality  and  by  cleansing  the 
psychological  biases  off  subjective  questions,  Brazil’s  ranking  is  still  remarkable 
because it has nearly equaled the Chinese rates of expected happiness increases. If we 
are not growing as much as the Chinese, however, why do we experience such a similar 
feeling of prosperity about our future? 
What I’ll try to assert here about this Brazilian future happiness paradox is not 
that our growth seems Chinese-like, but that it is Chinese-like in fact. I arrived at this 
conclusion  in  the  light  of  IBGE’s  PNAD  data  released  since  my  last  article  was 
published. In fact, we had already noted the same difference in beat before based on the 
2005 PNAD data. In other words, a long story is changed: national accounts in 2005 and 
2006 show an accumulated per capita GDP growth of 3,84%! Whenever the GDP data 
is released, the usual comparison with the Haitian growth rates comes to the centre of 
the  debate.  In  its  turn,  PNAD  per  capita  household  income  growth,  excluding  the 
population growth rate, was 16,4% for the same period or 4,3 times larger than per 
capita GDP, even  after  the adjustments made to the national accounts.  In any  case, either Brazil is growing more than suggested by the GDP, or poverty is not falling as 
much as the PNAD celebrated figures (23,9%).  
In order to reconcile this statistic problem, we could look into the growth of 
GDP  elements  that  are  not  captured  by  the  PNAD  –  i.e.  consumption  movements 
unrelated  to  income.  The  issue  here  thus  concerns  the  order  of  magnitude  of  the 
observed discrepancy. Another issue is that these explanations increase the paradox, 
instead  of  reducing  it.  In  particular,  consumer  credit  boom  points  to  an  increase  in 
consumption expenses that are larger than increases in income. In addition, the Bovespa 
index increase of 60% in 2005 and 2006 suggests that the Brazilian economy has not 
undergone a strong reduction of income gains that could explain part of this discrepancy 
in growth rates. 
PNAD is a direct measure of the average size of the “wallet” of Brazilians and is 
the  result  of  nine  direct  questions  about  how  much  people  received  from  different 
income sources. PNAD, however, with its well-balanced sample including more than 
400,000 individual answers, has not undergone a single methodological change, nor has 
the INPC (inflation index) used in its adjustment. The Far-Eastern looks of the PNAD 
statistics are reflected in other indicators for 2005-2006, such as: retail sales (11,8%) 
and  4,6  million  jobs  created,  amongst  which  2,5  million  refer  to  new  formal  job 
positions.   
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Source: CPS/IBRE/FGV processing microdata from PNAD/IBGE 
 The graph shows that Brazil’s poorest (and only them) experienced a Chinese-
like growth at the beginning of the present decade, but in the past few years, all social 
groups  have  had  this  kind  of  growth  (please  see, 
http://www3.fgv.br/ibrecps/RET3/engl/index.htm). The recent boom is even of a better 
quality than the Chinese’s because it is combined with greater equity, while China has 
an increasing inequality – similar o Brazil’s rates during the economic miracle in the 
1960s.  Another  parallel  with  Brazil  in  the  second  half  of  the  1960s  is  the  lack  of 
political freedom in China – while we currently live in a democracy. Growing in a strict 
political regime is easier in the short-term, but not in the long-term. In environmental 
terms as well China has been noticed as the pollution-black sheep, whereas in Brazil a 
conservative management by the Ministry for the Environment hampers growth while 
also making it more sustainable. To sum it up, our Chinese-like growth is better than 
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Evolution in Time 
In this section, we present a disaggregate picture of the Brazilian population 
current poverty status quo. We have sought to identify which are the most vulnerable 
groups in this population and their relative importance in determining poverty.  
 
The tables below present a profile of the poverty in 2006, and its evolution in the 
past year. The contribution of each group to poverty and to total income is available in 




  We have not found great differences in the ratio of men and women in what 
concerns the extremely poor and average income variables. This is due to the fact that 
we have used  per capita household income concept that assumes perfect socialization 
of income inside the households, which are mostly inhabited by people of both sexes. It 
works as if income was poured into a common pot and then  distributed evenly among 
all household members. Looking at last year’s data, we have found income gains a bit 
higher for men (9,43% against women’s 8,9%). On the other hand, women have shown 
a slightly higher reduction in poverty (-14,83% for men and 15,46% for women).  
 
 
Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income                
Gender                               
   Population    Misery (%)    Average Income 
  Total  %    2006  2005  Var 
(%)    2006  2005  Var 
(%) 
Male  89219410  48.67    19.41  22.79  -14.83    494.04  451.46  9.43 
Female  94086190  51.33    19.22  22.74  -15.46    487.76  447.9  8.90 
    
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD/IBGE microdata 
 
Age 
Poverty decreases along with the individual’s age. Maybe the most interesting 
part of this association - in consonance with the conventional wisdom that the returns in 
the job market increases according to the worker’s experience (generally according to 
age) – is that it persists for those people aged over 60, the least poor of the age groups (5,02% against 38% of the groups of people with up to 9 years of age). The elderly have 
also  shown  the  greatest  reduction  in  the  rate  (-25,55%  between  2005  and  2006) 
probably as a function of the readjustment of the minimum wage. In terms of income, 
those aged between 50 and 54  years old have shown the greatest gain of 11,21% - 
achieving the second biggest level of income (R$ 702,38), only ranking after the group 
aged between 55 and 59 years old (732,95).  
 
Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income                
Age Range                            
   Population    Misery (%)    Average Income 
  Total  %    2006  2005  Var 
(%)    2006  2005  Var 
(%) 
0 to 4  13798142  7.53    33.88  38.66  -12.35    305.63  279.22  9.46 
5 to 9  16312711  8.90    33.32  38.21  -12.81    297.76  272.24  9.37 
10 to 14  17248564  9.41    29.79  34.08  -12.58    321.29  294.26  9.19 
15 to 19  16995337  9.27    21.85  25.82  -15.38    384.01  354.05  8.46 
20 to 24  16857360  9.20    16.79  19.31  -13.05    471.52  431.5  9.27 
25 to 29  15465502  8.44    16.48  20.07  -17.91    520.46  475.86  9.37 
30 to 35  16419462  8.96    18.32  21.39  -14.36    507.00  465.5  8.92 
36 to 39  10595543  5.78    16.82  20.25  -16.95    510.98  479.06  6.66 
40 to 44  12855837  7.01    15.39  18.32  -16.02    554.27  505.03  9.75 
45 to 49  10760288  5.87    13.71  15.12  -9.31    615.60  576.75  6.74 
50 to 54  9649584  5.26    11.79  14.12  -16.49    702.38  631.57  11.21 
55 to 59  7492867  4.09    9.84  12.42  -20.80    732.95  671.94  9.08 
60 or More  18854403  10.29    5.02  6.74  -25.55    693.28  655.19  5.81 
 





  As always, the most relevant factor determining inequality and poverty in the 
country is education. The table indicates that income increases along with the years of 
schooling. The good news is that the distance between extremes have diminished in the 
last year. The ratio of per capita income between  those who graduated from high school 
and  those who has never been to school, , that used to be 8,1, has fallen to 7,7 – 
according to past years’ trend. Consequently, in the last group, 35,10% of people are 
below the poverty line, while the first category has 2,8%, with an increase in this rate in 
the period 2005-2006. 
 
Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income                Head of Household Years of Schooling                
   Population    Misery (%)    Average Income 
  Total  %    2006  2005  Var 
(%)    2006  2005  Var 
(%) 
0  25914922  14.14    35.10  39.69  -11.56    212.50  193.59  9.77 
1 to 3  29957215  16.34    30.85  35.86  -13.96    254.29  229.68  10.72 
4 to 7  53029380  28.93    20.40  23.69  -13.91    336.99  313.07  7.64 
8 to 11  56209988  30.66    10.16  11.81  -13.96    524.83  499.47  5.08 
12 or More  17528393  9.56    2.82  2.43  15.86    1652.20  1568.1  5.36 
 




  The  poverty  rate  is  higher  among  native  people  (22,88%).  In  relation  to 
migrants, the poverty rate falls as they have been established for longer in the state of 
residence (10,7% for those who have settled down for more than 10 years). With gains 
of  8,09%,  this  last  group  presents  the  greatest  average  income  in  2006  (R$  618,64 
against R$ 441,57 of the native). 
 
Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income                
Immigration                               
   Population    Misery (%)    Average Income 
  Total  %    2006  2005  Var 
(%)    2006  2005  Var 
(%) 
Did Not Migrate  110239074  60.14    22.88  26.68  -14.23    441.57  404.07  9.28 
Less than 4 years  5104859  2.78    18.83  20.36  -7.51    581.11  532.02  9.23 
5 to 9 years  4425544  2.41    18.10  19.52  -7.29    556.39  509.43  9.22 
More than 10 years  25319878  13.81    10.70  13.3  -19.54    618.64  572.33  8.09 
  




  In  relation  to  the  job  status,  the  unemployed,  rural  employees  and  non-
remunerated groups present the biggest share of poverty (28,79%, 29,14% and 34,7%, 
respectively).  In  the  other  extreme,  the  employers  are  just  3,57%  of  the  poor,  with 
average income of R$ 1.619,50. In terms of variation, we highlight the public servants 
and formal employees (fall of -24,9% and -21,54% in the poverty rate); and the non-
remunerated presented the largest income gains (12,25%), confirming the importance of 
alternative sources of income and job.   
Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income                         
Occupation Position                               
   Population    Misery (%)    Average Income 
  Total  %    2006  2005  Var 
(%)    2006  2005  Var 
(%) 
No job  8141149  4.44    28.79  32.34  -10.99    314.84  291.78  7.90 
Inactive   57945806  31.61    19.62  22.49  -12.75    464.03  435.39  6.58 
Agricultural Employee  4598429  2.51    29.14  34.47  -15.45    227.68  210.1  8.37 
Domestic Employee  6415287  3.50    17.54  21.29  -17.64    286.48  260.99  9.77 
Registered Employee  24654519  13.45    4.23  5.39  -21.54    632.47  600.84  5.26 
Informal Employee  10462277  5.71    12.67  14.66  -13.58    486.65  464.48  4.77 
Self-Employed  18404061  10.04    16.86  20.22  -16.63    525.86  470.41  11.79 
Employer  3932568  2.15    3.57  3.05  17.12    1619.50  1514.9  6.91 
Civil Servant  9697858  5.29    4.14  5.52  -24.99    955.96  857  11.55 
Non-paid  8942575  4.88    34.70  40.82  -14.99    285.84  254.65  12.25 
Ignored  30111071  16.43    33.58  0  0.00    301.36  0  0.00 
 
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD/IBGE microdata 
 
Colour or Race  
Poverty is greater amongst afro-descendants (23,57% e 27,59%), who represent 
49% of the Brazilian people. The other half of the population (white) has the lowest rate 
(11,88%) and the greatest decrease of the period (-16,83%). The second group has an 
average  income  twice  as  big  as  the  first  group.  The  remaining  groups  have  little 
representativeness in the total population. The greatest fall in poverty (-21,85%) has 
been observed among those who have defined themselves as indigenous, who are only 
0,27% of the population. When launching the PNAD, the IBGE has drawn attention to 
the increase of those who define themselves as “black”, which in Marcelo Paixão’s 
opinion (who runs the racial issues lab in the UFRJ) “is an advance” – and we agree 
with him, although it makes the comparability of income indicators across time more 
difficult.   
Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income                         
Race                               
   Population    Misery (%)    Average Income 
  Total  %    2006  2005  Var (%)   2006  2005  Var (%) 
Indigenous  499865  0.27    26.21  33.54  -21.85    352.79  356.48  -1.03 
White  92227496  50.31    11.88  14.28  -16.83    658.05  602.99  9.13 
Asian   903581  0.49    9.78  9.29  5.23    1038.80  1121.3  -7.36 
Black  12641660  6.90    23.57  26.64  -11.52    338.76  315.78  7.28 
Mulatto  77029039  42.02    27.59  32.38  -14.80    310.03  280.03  10.72 
Ignored  3959  0.00    26.32  0  0.00    266.09  0  0.00 
 
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD/IBGE microdata 
 
 Position in the Family 
Regarding this position, the children present the highest poverty rate (24,87% 
while the heads of the family may have 14,97%) and last year’s lowest reduction (-
13.87% against -16.13% of the heads) despite the expansion in the coverage of Bolsa-
Família, which targets this group (family with children). 
   
Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income                         
Family Position                               
   Population    Misery (%)    Average Income 
  Total  %    2006  2005  Var (%)    2006  2005  Var (%) 
Head   58229040  31.77    14.97  17.85  -16.13    579.57  536.66  8.00 
Spouse   37720586  20.58    15.77  18.89  -16.52    547.97  502.74  9.00 
Offspring  76062711  41.50    24.87  28.87  -13.87    401.62  364.23  10.27 
Other relative  10678215  5.83    16.52  18.67  -11.49    429.35  409.99  4.72 
Non-paying, non-relative 
 residing in household  615048  0.34    9.87  16.06  -38.57    682.33  534.28  27.71 
 
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD/IBGE microdata 
  
Sub-normal aglomerates (Slums – “favelas”) 
Poverty  has  fallen  less  markedly  in  sub-normal  agglomerates  (slums)  in 
comparison  to  the  total  (-12,24%  against  -15,34%).  The  same  has  happened  to  the 
average  income,  where  the  relative  gains  was  of  just  6,97%  in  the  sub-normal 
agglomerates. 
 
Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income                         
Place of Residence                               
   Population    Misery (%)    Average Income 
  Total  %    2006  2005  Var 
(%)    2006  2005  Var 
(%) 
Not special  176020890  96.03    18.99  22.43  -15.34    500.66  458.46  9.20 
Subnormal Dwelling  7249484  3.95    26.99  30.76  -12.24    253.60  237.08  6.97 
 




Mato Grosso do Sul, followed by Santa Catarina, were the states that presented 
the largest reduction in  poverty  (-29,56%  and  -26,3%, respectively).  In the  extreme 
opposite, Maranhão had the smallest reduction in poverty (-9,73%) and was the state 
that has accumulated the greatest gain in income in the last year (33,74%).  
Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income                         
States                               
   Population    Misery (%)    Average Income 
  Total  %    2006  2005  Var 
(%)    2006  2005  Var 
(%) 
Rondônia  1067181  0.58    14.43  20.86  -30.84    489.42  446.3  9.66 
Acre  460351  0.25    21.62  29.07  -25.62    449.90  374.93  20.00 
Amazonas  2592075  1.41    18.61  21.61  -13.89    360.58  334.28  7.87 
Roraima  333030  0.18    24.51  37.83  -35.20    405.96  281.4  44.26 
Pará  5338987  2.91    25.78  27.95  -7.76    325.37  302.33  7.62 
Amapá  579569  0.32    20.24  24.46  -17.23    348.72  367.51  -5.11 
Tocantins  1331282  0.73    24.83  30.78  -19.33    328.66  299.41  9.77 
Maranhão  6174842  3.37    44.23  49  -9.73    251.37  187.96  33.74 
Piauí  3028070  1.65    40.08  46.47  -13.76    276.09  234.26  17.85 
Ceará  8201575  4.47    36.05  43.47  -17.07    265.59  246.18  7.89 
Rio Grande do Norte  3041536  1.66    29.57  35.03  -15.58    326.54  316.82  3.07 
Paraíba  3619286  1.97    30.54  39.18  -22.06    309.41  277.7  11.42 
Pernambuco  8496951  4.64    36.77  41.89  -12.22    300.08  274.3  9.40 
Alagoas  3051521  1.66    44.44  50.12  -11.34    274.85  212.39  29.41 
Sergipe  2003775  1.09    30.84  35.81  -13.88    323.12  292.09  10.62 
Bahia  13927754  7.60    34.72  40.24  -13.71    290.58  255.95  13.53 
Minas Gerais  19454621  10.61    16.56  19.94  -16.96    466.23  416.99  11.81 
Espírito Santo  3467645  1.89    16.89  21.03  -19.68    480.69  451.69  6.42 
Rio de Janeiro  15557046  8.49    11.84  13.86  -14.54    649.15  580.69  11.79 
São Paulo  41056265  22.40    9.94  11.32  -12.22    656.53  616.28  6.53 
Paraná  10378661  5.66    9.79  13.04  -24.91    555.32  520.9  6.61 
Santa Catarina  5945492  3.24    4.68  6.35  -26.23    640.70  577.31  10.98 
Rio Grande do Sul  10940384  5.97    10.20  12.22  -16.54    586.46  548.5  6.92 
Mato Grosso do Sul  2294716  1.25    12.50  17.74  -29.56    493.75  435.39  13.40 
Mato Grosso  2862607  1.56    15.48  17.58  -11.94    454.38  416.74  9.03 
Goiás  5729829  3.13    13.48  17.46  -22.78    453.09  441.46  2.63 
Distrito Federal  2370549  1.29    11.80  14.46  -18.37    937.26  854.87  9.64 
 
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD/IBGE microdata 
 APPENDIX B: 
 
Types of income 
All sources – per capita family income is the result of sharing the monthly income of the 
family by the number of family members.  
 
Work Income – individual income from work, including secondary jobs.  
 
Public transfers – income from public transfers, including:  
￿  Social Security retirement pension – monthly revenue, normally received in the 
reference month from 
 
Pensions from the Army 
￿  Other types of pension – also monthly, received in the month of reference, as a 
pension complement or supplement paid by an insurance company or directly by 
a pension fund.  
 
￿  Other type of pension – monthly received, normally in the month of reference, 
from  a  social  assistance  fund,  insurance  fund  or  pension  fund,  to  another 
person’s beneficiary or maintenance payments.  
 
￿  Permanence payment – monthly revenue, in the month of reference.  
 
Private Transfers – income from private transfers, including: 
￿  Rent – for the monthly revenue, normally received in the month of reference, 
rent from real estate, machinery, equipment, etc letting   
 
￿  Donation received from a person who is not a member of the household – for the 
monthly revenue, a donation which is not the payment of services provided; 
 
Savings account interest rates and other financial investments - for the monthly 
revenue,  normally  received  in  the  month  of  reference,  from  financial  investments 
(savings  accounts,  interest,  dividents,  etc)  partnership,  etc.  It  is  also  included  the 
revenue from programs such as the bolsa-escola or the bolsa família, for instance. Analysis: 
Poverty/ CPS Line – proportion of people with family income from all types of sources 
below the poverty line (R$ 124,63 in São Paulo prices in 2006). 
 
Poverty/ CPS US$ – proportion of people with family income from all types of sources 
below the poverty line (R$ a preços de São Paulo em 2006). 
 
Average income – total population’s average income. 
  
Medium  Income – the intermediate income level that divides the population in two 
groups of equal population size.  
 APPENDIX C: Data on Contribution of Socio-Demographic Factors to Income 
and Poverty Measures 
 
 
Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income          
Total Population                
   Population    Contribution 
  Total  %    Misery  Income 
Total  183305600  100    100.00  100.00 
 
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD 2006/IBGE microdata 
 
Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income          
Gender                
   Population    Contribution 
  Total  %    Misery  Income 
Male  89219410  48.67    48.91  48.99 
Female  94086190  51.33    51.09  51.01 
 
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD 2006/IBGE microdata 
 
Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income          
Age Range                
   Population    Contribution 
  Total  %    Misery  Income 
0 to 4  13798142  7.53    13.21  4.69 
5 to 9  16312711  8.90    15.35  5.40 
10 to 14  17248564  9.41    14.51  6.16 
15 to 19  16995337  9.27    10.49  7.25 
20 to 24  16857360  9.20    7.99  8.83 
25 to 29  15465502  8.44    7.20  8.95 
30 to 35  16419462  8.96    8.50  9.25 
36 to 39  10595543  5.78    5.03  6.02 
40 to 44  12855837  7.01    5.59  7.92 
45 to 49  10760288  5.87    4.17  7.36 
50 to 54  9649584  5.26    3.21  7.53 
55 to 59  7492867  4.09    2.08  6.10 
60 or More  18854403  10.29    2.67  14.53 
 
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD 2006/IBGE microdata 
 
Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income          
Head of Household 
Years of Schooling                
   Population    Contribution 
  Total  %    Misery  Income 
0  25914922  14.14    25.69  6.12 
1 to 3  29957215  16.34    26.11  8.47 
4 to 7  53029380  28.93    30.55  19.86 
8 to 11  56209988  30.66    16.13  32.79 
12 or More  17528393  9.56    1.39  32.19 
 
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD 2006/IBGE microdata 
 Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income          
Race                
   Population    Contribution 
  Total  %    Misery  Income 
Indigenous  499865  0.27    0.37  0.20 
White  92227496  50.31    30.94  67.46 
Asian   903581  0.49    0.25  1.04 
Black  12641660  6.90    8.42  4.76 
Mulatto  77029039  42.02    60.02  26.54 
Ignored  3959  0.00    0.00  0.00 
 
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD 2006/IBGE microdata 
 
Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income          
Family Position                
   Population    Contribution 
  Total  %    Misery  Income 
Head   58229040  31.77    24.62  37.51 
Spouse   37720586  20.58    16.80  22.97 
Offspring  76062711  41.50    53.42  33.95 
Other relative  10678215  5.83    4.98  5.10 
Non-paying, non-relative 
 residing in household  615048  0.34    0.17  0.47 
 
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD 2006/IBGE microdata 
 
Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income          
Immigration                
   Population    Contribution 
  Total  %    Misery  Income 
Did Not Migrate  110239074  60.14    71.25  54.10 
Less than 4 years  5104859  2.78    2.72  3.30 
5 to 9 years   4425544  2.41    2.26  2.74 
More than 10 years  25319878  13.81    7.65  17.41 
 
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD 2006/IBGE microdata 
 
Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income          
Occupation Position                
   Population    Contribution 
  Total  %     Misery  Income 
No job  8141149  4.44    6.62  2.85 
Inactive   57945806  31.61    32.11  29.89 
Agricultural Employee  4598429  2.51    3.79  1.16 
Domestic Employee  6415287  3.50    3.18  2.04 
Registered Employee  24654519  13.45    2.94  17.33 
Informal Employee  10462277  5.71    3.74  5.66 
Self-Employed  18404061  10.04    8.76  10.76 
Employer  3932568  2.15    0.40  7.08 
Civil Servant  9697858  5.29    1.13  10.30 
Non-paid  8942575  4.88    8.76  2.84 
Ignored  30111071  16.43    28.56  10.09 
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD 2006/IBGE microdata 
Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income          Maternity                
   Population    Contribution 
  Total  %     Misery  Income 
Is a mother  42099244  22.97    21.76  21.53 
Not a mother   29116125  15.88    13.90  18.02 
 
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD 2006/IBGE microdata 
 
Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income          
Type of City                
   Population    Contribution 
  Total  %     Misery  Income 
Metropolitan  58459895  31.89    23.20  41.22 
Urban  98827186  53.91    46.70  52.33 
Rural  26018519  14.19    30.10  6.45 
 
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD 2006/IBGE microdata 
 
Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income          
Place of Residence                
   Population    Contribution 
  Total  %     Misery  Income 
Not special  176020890  96.03    94.40  97.95 
Subnormal Dwelling  7249484  3.95    5.53  2.04 
 
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD 2006/IBGE microdata 
 
Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income          
Geographic Region                
   Population    Contribuição 
  Total  %     Misery  Income 
North   10371193  5.66    6.53  4.16 
Northeast  51545310  28.12    53.22  16.41 
Southeast  79535577  43.39    27.48  53.12 
South   27264537  14.87    6.81  17.77 
Center   14588983  7.96    5.97  8.55 
 
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD 2006/IBGE microdata 
 
Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income          
Metropolitan Region                
   Population    Contribution 
  Total  %     Misery  Income 
Pará  2034910  1.11    1.33  0.90 
Ceará  3402298  1.86    2.24  1.40 
Pernambuco  3639847  1.99    2.90  1.70 
Bahia  3397757  1.85    2.16  1.77 
Minas Gerais  4960258  2.71    1.58  3.41 
Rio de Janeiro  11682332  6.37    3.79  8.99 
São Paulo  19666573  10.73    6.55  15.07 
Paraná  3214908  1.75    0.63  2.31 
Rio Grande do Sul  4090463  2.23    1.22  3.19 
Distrito Federal  2370549  1.29    0.79  2.47 
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD 2006/IBGE microdata  Poverty Proflie - Per Capita Household Income          
States                
   Population    Contribution 
  Total  %     Misery  Income 
Rondônia  1067181  0.58    0.43  0.58 
Acre  460351  0.25    0.28  0.23 
Amazonas  2592075  1.41    1.36  1.04 
Roraima  333030  0.18    0.23  0.15 
Pará  5338987  2.91    3.89  1.93 
Amapá  579569  0.32    0.33  0.22 
Tocantins  1331282  0.73    0.93  0.49 
Maranhão  6174842  3.37    7.71  1.73 
Piauí  3028070  1.65    3.43  0.93 
Ceará  8201575  4.47    8.35  2.42 
Rio Grande do Norte  3041536  1.66    2.54  1.10 
Paraíba  3619286  1.97    3.12  1.24 
Pernambuco  8496951  4.64    8.83  2.83 
Alagoas  3051521  1.66    3.83  0.93 
Sergipe  2003775  1.09    1.75  0.72 
Bahia  13927754  7.60    13.66  4.50 
Minas Gerais  19454621  10.61    9.10  10.08 
Espírito Santo  3467645  1.89    1.65  1.85 
Rio de Janeiro  15557046  8.49    5.20  11.22 
São Paulo  41056265  22.40    11.52  29.96 
Paraná  10378661  5.66    2.87  6.41 
Santa Catarina  5945492  3.24    0.79  4.23 
Rio Grande do Sul  10940384  5.97    3.15  7.13 
Mato Grosso do Sul  2294716  1.25    0.81  1.26 
Mato Grosso  2862607  1.56    1.25  1.45 
Goiás  5729829  3.13    2.18  2.89 
Distrito Federal  2370549  1.29    0.79  2.47 
 
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD 2006/IBGE microdata 
 
 APPENDIX D: Mincerian Equations, Income Sources and Electoral Cycles 
 
In order to study the diversity of short run impacts of elections between voters 
and non voters, we need data from in electoral and non electoral years for both of them. 
Our sample is thus divided in 4 groups. The interactive effect between the voting age 
dummy (dV) and the electoral year dummy (dY), which as we will see gives us the 
difference  in  difference  estimator.  We  applied  this  using  a  standard  mincerian  type 
regression applied to each of the main income sources and to total sum of sources for 
the new PNAD questionnaire period 1992 to 2006 using the INPC (Consumer Price 
Index) as the deflator. Mathematically, we can represent this difference in difference 
estimator (D-D) used from the following equation: 
 
Ln Y = g0 + g1*dV + g2*dY + (D-D)*dV*dY + other controls 
    
 
A.  All sources 
 
 
The SURVEYREG Procedure 
 
Regression Analysis for Dependent Variable LNRFPC 
 
Data Summary 
Number of Observations  4588194
Sum of Weights  2089428389
Weighted Mean of LNRFPC  5.35424





Root MSE  0.8163
Denominator DF  4588193
 





Square F Value Pr > F
Model  44 1.1556E9 26262559 86557.1 <.0001
Error  4.59E6 1.3921E9 303
Corrected Total  4.59E6 2.5477E9
 
 
Tests of Model Effects 
Effect  Num DF F Value Pr > F
Model  44 67153.3 <.0001
Intercept  1 3787739 <.0001
SEXO  1 1274.33 <.0001
cor  4 21383.3 <.0001
EDUCHEFE  4 254051 <.0001
NEW  2 56298.9 <.0001
MIGRAUF  4 1114.16 <.0001
chavuf  26 8954.81 <.0001
FXELEIT2  1 153526 <.0001
ANOEL3  1 4320.26 <.0001
FXELEIT2*ANOEL3  1 43.51 <.0001
 
 The denominator degrees of freedom for the F tests is 4588193. 
Estimated Regression Coefficients 
Parameter  Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept  6.4640314 0.00280372 2305.52 <.0001
SEXO Feminino  -0.0298563 0.00083636 -35.70 <.0001
SEXO Masculino  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
cor Amarela  0.5197314 0.00808983 64.25 <.0001
cor Branca  0.3024506 0.00179501 168.50 <.0001
cor Indígena  -0.0644633 0.01013606 -6.36 <.0001
cor Parda  0.0362302 0.00178585 20.29 <.0001
cor Preta  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
EDUCHEFE 1  -1.7493515 0.00196100 -892.07 <.0001
EDUCHEFE 2  -1.6495821 0.00192980 -854.79 <.0001
EDUCHEFE 3  -1.4386422 0.00182001 -790.46 <.0001
EDUCHEFE 4  -0.9866496 0.00186087 -530.21 <.0001
EDUCHEFE 5  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
NEW Metropolitana  0.1008160 0.00107358 93.91 <.0001
NEW Rural  -0.3705412 0.00127550 -290.51 <.0001
NEW Urbana  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
MIGRAUF 5 a 9 Anos  -0.0056990 0.00262393 -2.17 0.0299
MIGRAUF Ignorado  0.0388860 0.00109079 35.65 <.0001
MIGRAUF Mais de 10 Anos  0.0887103 0.00142082 62.44 <.0001
MIGRAUF Menos de 4 Anos  0.0122323 0.00244076 5.01 <.0001
MIGRAUF Não imigrou  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
chavuf AC  -0.2551262 0.00643483 -39.65 <.0001
chavuf AL  -0.5822194 0.00335799 -173.38 <.0001
chavuf AM  -0.4014750 0.00316104 -127.01 <.0001
chavuf AP  -0.3106760 0.00609884 -50.94 <.0001
chavuf BA  -0.4740694 0.00183990 -257.66 <.0001
chavuf CE  -0.6285412 0.00212297 -296.07 <.0001
chavuf DF  -0.0411255 0.00282370 -14.56 <.0001
chavuf ES  -0.1878029 0.00319724 -58.74 <.0001
chavuf GO  -0.1556650 0.00216378 -71.94 <.0001
chavuf MA  -0.6364961 0.00328244 -193.91 <.0001
chavuf MG  -0.2210487 0.00161771 -136.64 <.0001
chavuf MS  -0.1723167 0.00296154 -58.18 <.0001
chavuf MT  -0.1115549 0.00290350 -38.42 <.0001
chavuf PA  -0.4306605 0.00232438 -185.28 <.0001
chavuf PB  -0.5467118 0.00306405 -178.43 <.0001
chavuf PE  -0.6000953 0.00203275 -295.21 <.0001
chavuf PI  -0.6310230 0.00366924 -171.98 <.0001
chavuf PR  -0.1919197 0.00198249 -96.81 <.0001
chavuf RJ  -0.1301675 0.00179751 -72.42 <.0001
chavuf RN  -0.4541763 0.00333894 -136.02 <.0001
chavuf RO  -0.1875665 0.00433220 -43.30 <.0001
chavuf RR  -0.2308537 0.00819194 -28.18 <.0001
chavuf RS  -0.1004869 0.00187628 -53.56 <.0001
chavuf SC  0.0122983 0.00252662 4.87 <.0001
chavuf SE  -0.4358546 0.00351540 -123.98 <.0001
chavuf TO  -0.3858696 0.00374511 -103.03 <.0001
chavuf ZSP  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
FXELEIT2 Vota  0.4191694 0.00107819 388.77 <.0001
FXELEIT2 ZNão vota  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
ANOEL3 Eleitoral  0.0611294 0.00170254 35.90 <.0001
ANOEL3 ZNão eleitoral  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
FXELEIT2*ANOEL3 Vota Eleitoral  0.0136230 0.00206538 6.60 <.0001
FXELEIT2*ANOEL3 Vota ZNão eleitoral  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
FXELEIT2*ANOEL3 ZNão vota Eleitoral  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
FXELEIT2*ANOEL3 ZNão vota ZNão eleitoral  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD /IBGE microdata 
 B. Earnings from the Main Job  
 
The SURVEYREG Procedure 
 
Regression Analysis for Dependent Variable LNRTPC 
 
Data Summary 
Number of Observations  4226403
Sum of Weights  1921669223
Weighted Mean of LNRTPC  5.15611





Root MSE  0.8455
Denominator DF  4226402
 





Square F Value Pr > F
Model  44 1.1858E9 26950713 82918.7 <.0001
Error  4.23E6 1.3737E9 325
Corrected Total  4.23E6 2.5595E9
 
 
Tests of Model Effects 
Effect  Num DF F Value Pr > F
Model  44 63040.2 <.0001
Intercept  1 2923364 <.0001
SEXO  1 4225.51 <.0001
cor  4 15366.1 <.0001
EDUCHEFE  4 240741 <.0001
NEW  2 55300.8 <.0001
MIGRAUF  4 806.37 <.0001
chavuf  26 10482.6 <.0001
FXELEIT2  1 73846.7 <.0001
ANOEL3  1 1150.94 <.0001
FXELEIT2*ANOEL3  1 32.21 <.0001
 
 
The denominator degrees of freedom for the F tests is 4226402. 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients 
Parameter  Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept  6.4140674 0.00302949 2117.21 <.0001
SEXO Feminino  -0.0586404 0.00090211 -65.00 <.0001
SEXO Masculino  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
cor Amarela  0.5006771 0.00910379 55.00 <.0001
cor Branca  0.2850294 0.00194263 146.72 <.0001
cor Indígena  -0.0888352 0.01106047 -8.03 <.0001
cor Parda  0.0434081 0.00193220 22.47 <.0001
cor Preta  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
EDUCHEFE 1  -1.8702127 0.00217681 -859.15 <.0001
EDUCHEFE 2  -1.6827010 0.00211080 -797.19 <.0001
EDUCHEFE 3  -1.4175131 0.00197214 -718.77 <.0001
EDUCHEFE 4  -0.9456603 0.00200836 -470.86 <.0001
EDUCHEFE 5  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
NEW Metropolitana  0.1304462 0.00115160 113.27 <.0001Estimated Regression Coefficients 
Parameter  Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t|
NEW Rural  -0.3806678 0.00138622 -274.61 <.0001
NEW Urbana  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
MIGRAUF 5 a 9 Anos  0.0569345 0.00276506 20.59 <.0001
MIGRAUF Ignorado  0.0353530 0.00118470 29.84 <.0001
MIGRAUF Mais de 10 Anos  0.0781769 0.00155593 50.24 <.0001
MIGRAUF Menos de 4 Anos  0.0630671 0.00260370 24.22 <.0001
MIGRAUF Não imigrou  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
chavuf AC  -0.2907883 0.00699953 -41.54 <.0001
chavuf AL  -0.6246580 0.00369275 -169.16 <.0001
chavuf AM  -0.3706087 0.00327701 -113.09 <.0001
chavuf AP  -0.3121122 0.00647307 -48.22 <.0001
chavuf BA  -0.5383838 0.00197896 -272.05 <.0001
chavuf CE  -0.7832446 0.00235954 -331.95 <.0001
chavuf DF  -0.0740262 0.00294416 -25.14 <.0001
chavuf ES  -0.2223241 0.00334966 -66.37 <.0001
chavuf GO  -0.1393155 0.00229755 -60.64 <.0001
chavuf MA  -0.7188054 0.00356942 -201.38 <.0001
chavuf MG  -0.2872878 0.00174699 -164.45 <.0001
chavuf MS  -0.1618876 0.00317655 -50.96 <.0001
chavuf MT  -0.0531624 0.00301252 -17.65 <.0001
chavuf PA  -0.4652544 0.00249267 -186.65 <.0001
chavuf PB  -0.7143233 0.00350892 -203.57 <.0001
chavuf PE  -0.7042893 0.00224623 -313.54 <.0001
chavuf PI  -0.8629884 0.00417186 -206.86 <.0001
chavuf PR  -0.2045567 0.00211194 -96.86 <.0001
chavuf RJ  -0.2131637 0.00192340 -110.83 <.0001
chavuf RN  -0.5624868 0.00376034 -149.58 <.0001
chavuf RO  -0.1361841 0.00453753 -30.01 <.0001
chavuf RR  -0.1845074 0.00836825 -22.05 <.0001
chavuf RS  -0.1766143 0.00202494 -87.22 <.0001
chavuf SC  0.0017193 0.00268815 0.64 0.5224
chavuf SE  -0.4816776 0.00371293 -129.73 <.0001
chavuf TO  -0.3888423 0.00402292 -96.66 <.0001
chavuf ZSP  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
FXELEIT2 Vota  0.3125189 0.00114909 271.97 <.0001
FXELEIT2 ZNão vota  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
ANOEL3 Eleitoral  0.0315732 0.00182792 17.27 <.0001
ANOEL3 ZNão eleitoral  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
FXELEIT2*ANOEL3 Vota Eleitoral  0.0126677 0.00223194 5.68 <.0001
FXELEIT2*ANOEL3 Vota ZNão eleitoral  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
FXELEIT2*ANOEL3 ZNão vota Eleitoral  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
FXELEIT2*ANOEL3 ZNão vota ZNão eleitoral  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD /IBGE microdata 
 C. Social Security Benefits 
 
The SURVEYREG Procedure 
 
Regression Analysis for Dependent Variable LNRPPC 
 
Data Summary 
Number of Observations  1449498
Sum of Weights  671129733
Weighted Mean of LNRPPC  4.72470





Root MSE  0.9085
Denominator DF  1449497
 
 





Square F Value Pr > F
Model  44 1.9546E8 4442198 11622.9 <.0001
Error  1.45E6 5.5397E8 382
Corrected Total  1.45E6 7.4943E8
 
 
Tests of Model Effects 
Effect  Num DF F Value Pr > F
Model  44 8876.90 <.0001
Intercept  1 742502 <.0001
SEXO  1 14.14 0.0002
cor  4 4531.94 <.0001
EDUCHEFE  4 28981.4 <.0001
NEW  2 1623.30 <.0001
MIGRAUF  4 1321.33 <.0001
chavuf  26 840.90 <.0001
FXELEIT2  1 51630.4 <.0001
ANOEL3  1 2834.00 <.0001
FXELEIT2*ANOEL3  1 37.80 <.0001
 
 
The denominator degrees of freedom for the F tests is 1449497. 
 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients 
Parameter  Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept  5.1642341 0.00613290 842.05 <.0001
SEXO Feminino  0.0062289 0.00165666 3.76 0.0002
SEXO Masculino  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
cor Amarela  0.2397169 0.01446138 16.58 <.0001
cor Branca  0.2857001 0.00344614 82.90 <.0001
cor Indígena  0.0825952 0.01991743 4.15 <.0001
cor Parda  0.0463314 0.00342493 13.53 <.0001
cor Preta  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
EDUCHEFE 1  -1.2982717 0.00433399 -299.56 <.0001
EDUCHEFE 2  -1.2700023 0.00436502 -290.95 <.0001
EDUCHEFE 3  -1.1287421 0.00430114 -262.43 <.0001
EDUCHEFE 4  -0.7561692 0.00454606 -166.34 <.0001
EDUCHEFE 5  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .Estimated Regression Coefficients 
Parameter  Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t|
NEW Metropolitana  0.0533487 0.00220013 24.25 <.0001
NEW Rural  -0.0952810 0.00218558 -43.60 <.0001
NEW Urbana  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
MIGRAUF 5 a 9 Anos  -0.0118006 0.00688857 -1.71 0.0867
MIGRAUF Ignorado  0.1097162 0.00211740 51.82 <.0001
MIGRAUF Mais de 10 Anos  0.1655675 0.00267824 61.82 <.0001
MIGRAUF Menos de 4 Anos  0.0352852 0.00628725 5.61 <.0001
MIGRAUF Não imigrou  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
chavuf AC  -0.1222714 0.01315897 -9.29 <.0001
chavuf AL  -0.1689746 0.00639584 -26.42 <.0001
chavuf AM  -0.3636551 0.00728136 -49.94 <.0001
chavuf AP  -0.2087067 0.01471148 -14.19 <.0001
chavuf BA  -0.1269324 0.00355871 -35.67 <.0001
chavuf CE  -0.1774616 0.00382507 -46.39 <.0001
chavuf DF  0.0806621 0.00702107 11.49 <.0001
chavuf ES  -0.0116112 0.00642069 -1.81 0.0705
chavuf GO  -0.1592401 0.00484055 -32.90 <.0001
chavuf MA  -0.2480486 0.00547676 -45.29 <.0001
chavuf MG  -0.0815738 0.00322215 -25.32 <.0001
chavuf MS  -0.2139209 0.00686102 -31.18 <.0001
chavuf MT  -0.2421547 0.00707394 -34.23 <.0001
chavuf PA  -0.3105443 0.00482420 -64.37 <.0001
chavuf PB  -0.1316059 0.00533890 -24.65 <.0001
chavuf PE  -0.2270586 0.00368418 -61.63 <.0001
chavuf PI  -0.0994587 0.00594884 -16.72 <.0001
chavuf PR  -0.1128926 0.00403861 -27.95 <.0001
chavuf RJ  0.1679823 0.00367478 45.71 <.0001
chavuf RN  -0.1502645 0.00600164 -25.04 <.0001
chavuf RO  -0.2506483 0.01055914 -23.74 <.0001
chavuf RR  -0.3189584 0.01899653 -16.79 <.0001
chavuf RS  0.0634935 0.00365073 17.39 <.0001
chavuf SC  0.0313157 0.00526636 5.95 <.0001
chavuf SE  -0.1126907 0.00700657 -16.08 <.0001
chavuf TO  -0.2614282 0.00763279 -34.25 <.0001
chavuf ZSP  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
FXELEIT2 Vota  0.5129318 0.00224696 228.28 <.0001
FXELEIT2 ZNão vota  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
ANOEL3 Eleitoral  0.1050666 0.00388938 27.01 <.0001
ANOEL3 ZNão eleitoral  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
FXELEIT2*ANOEL3 Vota Eleitoral  0.0274100 0.00445838 6.15 <.0001
FXELEIT2*ANOEL3 Vota ZNão eleitoral  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
FXELEIT2*ANOEL3 ZNão vota Eleitoral  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
FXELEIT2*ANOEL3 ZNão vota ZNão eleitoral  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD /IBGE microdata 
 D. Social Programs Benefits (residual) 
 
The SURVEYREG Procedure 
 
Regression Analysis for Dependent Variable LNROPC 
 
Data Summary 
Number of Observations  856714
Sum of Weights  381195612
Weighted Mean of LNROPC  2.97746





Root MSE  1.5967
Denominator DF  856713
 





Square F Value Pr > F
Model  44 1.6606E8 3774171 3326.90 <.0001
Error  856669 9.7184E8 1134
Corrected Total  856713 1.1379E9
 
 
Tests of Model Effects 
Effect  Num DF F Value Pr > F
Model  44 2721.05 <.0001
Intercept  1 76845.9 <.0001
SEXO  1 271.58 <.0001
cor  4 1567.45 <.0001
EDUCHEFE  4 6732.64 <.0001
NEW  2 2875.43 <.0001
MIGRAUF  4 285.38 <.0001
chavuf  26 367.62 <.0001
FXELEIT2  1 5655.43 <.0001
ANOEL3  1 4149.24 <.0001
FXELEIT2*ANOEL3  1 20.67 <.0001
 
 
The denominator degrees of freedom for the F tests is 856713. 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients 
Parameter  Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept  3.6578875 0.01405081 260.33 <.0001
SEXO Feminino  0.0633950 0.00384687 16.48 <.0001
SEXO Masculino  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
cor Amarela  0.7517198 0.03461318 21.72 <.0001
cor Branca  0.4079606 0.00838640 48.65 <.0001
cor Indígena  0.1118233 0.04264446 2.62 0.0087
cor Parda  0.0892293 0.00802424 11.12 <.0001
cor Preta  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
EDUCHEFE 1  -1.3579100 0.00929518 -146.09 <.0001
EDUCHEFE 2  -1.3754167 0.00922038 -149.17 <.0001
EDUCHEFE 3  -1.2848092 0.00891172 -144.17 <.0001
EDUCHEFE 4  -0.8924529 0.00928096 -96.16 <.0001
EDUCHEFE 5  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
NEW Metropolitana  0.1905225 0.00565061 33.72 <.0001Estimated Regression Coefficients 
Parameter  Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t|
NEW Rural  -0.2700418 0.00473617 -57.02 <.0001
NEW Urbana  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
MIGRAUF 5 a 9 Anos  -0.0660781 0.01323508 -4.99 <.0001
MIGRAUF Ignorado  0.0731413 0.00524404 13.95 <.0001
MIGRAUF Mais de 10 Anos  0.2161543 0.00729540 29.63 <.0001
MIGRAUF Menos de 4 Anos  0.1798459 0.01207290 14.90 <.0001
MIGRAUF Não imigrou  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
chavuf AC  -0.1120786 0.01872245 -5.99 <.0001
chavuf AL  -0.2119259 0.01199633 -17.67 <.0001
chavuf AM  -0.0052692 0.01611188 -0.33 0.7436
chavuf AP  0.1199508 0.02920174 4.11 <.0001
chavuf BA  -0.2085346 0.00873975 -23.86 <.0001
chavuf CE  -0.3229449 0.00866698 -37.26 <.0001
chavuf DF  0.1033931 0.01401008 7.38 <.0001
chavuf ES  -0.3883417 0.01670727 -23.24 <.0001
chavuf GO  0.2689400 0.01085253 24.78 <.0001
chavuf MA  -0.4371607 0.01217992 -35.89 <.0001
chavuf MG  -0.1200403 0.00910509 -13.18 <.0001
chavuf MS  0.0220711 0.01533588 1.44 0.1501
chavuf MT  0.1280460 0.01793937 7.14 <.0001
chavuf PA  -0.1878202 0.01058566 -17.74 <.0001
chavuf PB  -0.2611570 0.01094721 -23.86 <.0001
chavuf PE  -0.1539434 0.00895451 -17.19 <.0001
chavuf PI  -0.1904402 0.01178975 -16.15 <.0001
chavuf PR  -0.1667457 0.01100812 -15.15 <.0001
chavuf RJ  0.2775775 0.01256310 22.09 <.0001
chavuf RN  -0.2940818 0.01216933 -24.17 <.0001
chavuf RO  0.0259212 0.02169823 1.19 0.2322
chavuf RR  0.0806649 0.02162573 3.73 0.0002
chavuf RS  -0.3293219 0.01043639 -31.56 <.0001
chavuf SC  0.0911424 0.01534061 5.94 <.0001
chavuf SE  -0.3737697 0.01630938 -22.92 <.0001
chavuf TO  -0.2060798 0.01350527 -15.26 <.0001
chavuf ZSP  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
FXELEIT2 Vota  0.2856587 0.00504429 56.63 <.0001
FXELEIT2 ZNão vota  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
ANOEL3 Eleitoral  0.2257090 0.00556682 40.55 <.0001
ANOEL3 ZNão eleitoral  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
FXELEIT2*ANOEL3 Vota Eleitoral  0.0342894 0.00754285 4.55 <.0001
FXELEIT2*ANOEL3 Vota ZNão eleitoral  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
FXELEIT2*ANOEL3 ZNão vota Eleitoral  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
FXELEIT2*ANOEL3 ZNão vota ZNão eleitoral  0.0000000 0.00000000 . .
Source: CPS/FGV from PNAD /IBGE microdata 
 